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This paper presents an alternative view on the appropriate-
ness of international policy coordination. Policy-makers
compete for internationally mobile capital by offering club
goods which are used as input factors by firms. A country is
attractive for internationally mobile capital if the price
for investing there (tax rate on capital) and the quality of
the club goods offered lead to higher profits than else-
where. Because there are no spill-overs from national poli-
cy-making, policy coordination offers no gains to the bene-
volent politician. If policy-makers are of the Leviathan-
type, international policy coordination offers the chance to
escape restraints that the exit mechanism of capital flight
imposes upon this behaviour. Evidence on inflation and money
stock trends before and after the collapse of the Bretton
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I. Economic Policy-Making in Interdependent Nations: The
Standard View and an Alternative
The proposition that in nations linked by trade and by capi-
tal movements economic policies should be coordinated rather
than competitive has gained widespread support among econo-
mists and politicians. Its rationale is based on a Keynesi-
an model of interdependent nations and a game-theoretic
framework describing the targets and the behaviour of each
country's politicians. The message of the Keynesian model is
simple: employment and output are demand-determined. Demand
may not be sufficient to guarantee full employment. Govern-
ments can create additional demand with expansionary fiscal
and monetary policy. However, if the economy is sufficiently
open and small, some of the demand expansion will end up
outside the country as domestic consumers spend their ad-
ditional income on imports. From a Keynesian point of view
this constitutes an output gain foregone for the individual
country, but not for the world as a whole. National govern-
ments ' single-handed attempts to raise employment at home
are thus partially foiled by the spill-over of demand into
2
other countries.
The game-theoretic framework adds to this result assumptions
on the behaviour of politicians. Since jobs created abroad
do not translate into additional votes, governments will
from a certain point onward abstain from additional, single-
Cf. Cooper (1985), Home, Masson (1988) and Frenkel, Gold-
stein, Masson (1988) for summaries of earlier and more
recent work in this area.
2
It should be stressed that this scenario of a "locomotive
world" is only one possible example supporting the case
for international policy coordination. The same conclusion
can be arrived at in a model where domestic policy
measures harm foreign countries, i.e. a "beggar-thy-neigh-
bour-world". For an elaboration of this point cf. Martinez
Oliva (1987).- 2 -
handed expansionary measures because the costs of such
measures (e.g. increases in inflation) are not covered by
benefits to citizens of their own country. If each policy-
maker were at this point assured that additional expansiona-
ry measures would be reciprocated abroad, employment could
be increased further by a coordinated expansion leading to
mutual spillovers. As long as such assurance is not granted
(and this will be the case in the absence of policy coordi-
nation) , each policy-maker refrains from further expansion,
hoping to gain a free ride on the locomotive of other poli-
ticians' expansionary policy measures. In order to avoid the
resulting suboptimal state in which policies everywhere are
too restrictive, mutual assurance to adopt expansionary
measures if the other does so, i.e. policy coordination, is
needed. To sum up, the pro-coordination-view based on the
Keynesian model of interdependent nations and the game-theo-
retic framework makes a strong case for the international
coordination of economic policies because each country is
supposedly worse off in a world where policy-makers act
independently in comparison to a world where policies are
decided jointly.
2
The present paper aims to present a "German" alternative to
the Keynesian model of the world economy from which it dif-
fers in its emphasis on the role of capital accumulation for
more growth and employment. Essentially, we view different
locations (countries) of the world as competitors for inter-
nationally mobile resources. Each location is endowed with
This position has been put forward e.g. in Dreze et al.
(1987), p. 21-25.
2
This label has recently been attached to a group of econo-
mists that reject the hypothesis that international econo-
mic policy coordination is beneficial. Cf. Frenkel, Gold-
stein, Masson (1988, p. 151), who rightly observe that the
term is a slight misnomer.
We thus focus on one of the building-blocks of the pro-co-
ordination-view, which can be criticized for a variety of
other reasons. See Scheide and Sinn (1989).- 3 -
stocks of immobile resources which determine, the attractive-
ness of a particular location for the conduct of economic
activities. Immobile resources are land and the natural
resources embedded in it, human capital, the capital stock
already in place, and a stock of economic.policy decisions
which determine the framework for business activities. The
prime internationally mobile resource is malleable capital,
i.e. financial capital or savings. While labour may also be
regarded as internationally mobile, we abstract from this
possibility throughout the paper.
The stock of economic policy decisions plays a crucial role
as it determines the attractiveness of resident immobile
factors for internationally mobile resources. For example,
labour services may at a particular location be available at
a wage near or below their marginal value product. They are
therefore attractive for international investors. Neverthe-
less, a hostile attitude of the incumbent government towards
foreign owners of capital renders resident immobile factors
unemployable - not because their wage is too high but be-
cause the foreign investment complementary to local labour
is expected to be expropriated once it has become invested
in the country. This example illustrates the general
principle that through the effect of their policies on the
profitability of investment governments affect the world-
wide allocation of capital. All governments therefore com-
pete for financial capital and other internationally mobile
resources. Note that this conclusion pertains not only to
the attraction of inflows of resources from abroad but also
to the retention of local resources. Governments compete for
the savings of other countries' residents as well as for
those of their own.
The change of emphasis from competition for scarce demand to
competition for capital highlights the long-term aspects of
economic growth. It seems appropriate for a situation where
capital is the scarce factor needed to create more employ-- 4 -
ment and output. It also gives rise to an unorthodox inter-
pretation of what are now commonly called "current account
imbalances". If countries with successful economic policies
are seen as growth poles which attract capital, a positive
balance on the capital account (net capital imports) and a
negative balance on the trade account can no longer be re-
garded as a sign of a country "living beyond its means" but
rather signal that it is successful in attracting capital
goods from the rest of the world. Seen from the same angle,
a country like West Germany whose large and persistent trade
account surpluses are permanently being castigated in inter-
national fora, turns out to be a region whose residents find
it more profitable to invest abroad rather than at home. In
the long run such a tendency can be said to weaken the capi-
tal base of the West German economy. The label "World
Champion in Exports" for the West German economy therefore
acquires a hollow ring: German firms are supplying other
locations with capital goods that could - under different
government policies - have been invested in Germany. To sum
up: If nations compete for capital, the focus shifts from
trade in goods and services to the allocation of investment
among the various locations of this world. In the words of
Bertil Ohlin (1933, p. 307): "Instead of asking why certain
countries exchange certain goods with one another, one can
ask why production is divided between these countries in a
certain way".
Our analysis which focusses on capital accumulation supports
the view that economic policies should not be coordinated on
an international scale. The main reason is that the benefits
of policies improving the attractiveness of a location for
investors are likely to accrue exclusively to residents of
the country itself. Politicians thus have a strong incentive
to implement them. For example, an investor can only bene-
Unless, of course, benefits take such a long time in
making themselves felt that the implementing politicians
are no longer in power.- 5 -
fit from a change in the tax regime of a country if he in-
vests there. A well-functioning legal and financial infra-
structure can to a large extent only be used by residents
who pay for its services with their taxes. Free-riding of
other politicians is therefore considerably reduced. Within
the demand-spillover-scenario, governments are seen as pro-
ducers of goods that are public goods internationally.
Within the competition-for-capital-scenario, on the other
hand, governments produce local public goods that are pri-
vate goods internationally. In other words, governments
produce club goods. Within a country, no one can be excluded
from using the infrastructure or from benefiting from
prudent macro-economic policies. On an international scale,
exclusion is possible simply because the domain of national
policies ends at the border of a country. The need for in-
ternational policy coordination in the realm of macroecono-
mics in such a world is considerably reduced. Moreover, the
call for coordinating policies within such a framework is
equivalent to the formation of a cartel of clubs that will
most likely raise the price of their product and limit its
quantity. Another possible consequence may be a reduction of
choice among different programs of economic policy for in-
ternational investors. The paper elaborates on all these
points. In part II. we present the competition-for-capital
model in a more formal manner. Part III. takes a closer look
at some of the assumptions of the model and points to areas
of further research.
Cf. Connolly (1970) 's elaboration of this point.- 6 -
II. The Alternative View: Competition for Capital
II.1. Building blocks
Our model makes the following assumptions.
1. Attractiveness of a location for investors
In economic terms, a location is identically equal to the
immobile factors of production that reside there. Immobile
factors of production are land, labour, the stock of capital
already invested at a location, and a stock of economic
policy decisions that determine the framework for entrepre-
neurial activities (the present government's and its prede-
cessors' track record). Internationally mobile resources are
those that have not yet been devoted to any specific use and
therefore may be employed where they are expected to yield
the highest income. In this analysis we will focus on mobile
capital in the form of savings. It should be kept in mind,
however, that human capital is internationally mobile, too,
provided it is not overly specific. Immobile factors depend
on mobile factors of production: as long as savings continue
to be invested at one particular location, resident factors
of production can expect to earn additional income now and
in the future. The decision of owners of mobile capital to
invest at a particular location is guided by the profitabi-
lity of investment there relative to that of investment at
other locations which in turn depends on the price of local
factors relative to their productivity at different loca-
tions .
We define locations to be nations and not regions or towns.
One reason for doing so is the existence of governments
whose policy domains are nations. Since the quality of thestock of economic policy decisions applying to economic
activities within,one particular country affects the profi-
tability of investment there in much the same manner as the
quality of other immobile factors, it seems useful to focus
on nations as locations of economic activity. The second
reason for focussing on nations rather than lower-tier ju-
risdictions is the fact that there are national monies which
are linked by exchange rates. The existence of exchange
rates grants immobile factors the possibility of rendering
themselves more attractive to mobile savings by lowering
their price in foreign currency without lowering their price
in local currency, i.e. by engineering a real depreciation.
We will not pursue the implications of flexible exchange
rates in the present paper. The analysis is thus mainly ap-
plicable to a group of nations who have fixed exchange rates
among themselves. The European countries in the last two
years and - possibly - in the future may serve as an example
for such a group.
2. Behaviour of entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs choose among different investment locations at
home and abroad with the aim of maximizing the present value
of expected after-tax profits. Entrepreneurs invest the
savings they receive through capital markets and other fi-
nancial intermediaries in those locations where they are
expected to yield the highest return. Expected after-tax
profits depend on the marginal value product of labour and
capital, the tax rate, and a stock of local club goods whose
production is organized by the incumbent government and its
predecessors. We assume that local club goods are used non-
This is not to deny that there may be decisions taken at
lower jurisdictional levels that affect the profitability
of investment, e.g. community charges. Indeed a major part
of the literature on tax competition among federal states
of the United States is concerned with just that issue. We
believe, however, that the macroeconomic framework is the
more appropriate one if one wants to analyse the alloca-
tion of mobile capital among different nations.- 8 -
rivalrously by resident firms as a factor of production and
that the marginal value product of this stock of local
public goods differs with each resident firm. Marginal pro-
fit of firm j in country i may thus be expressed as
n? = p
3«f
3(kf 1, Gi) - wi-l - (tjL+r)-k (1)
where k and 1 are the additional, newly employed amounts of
labour and capital, w. the local wage, r the interest rate
on the world capital market, t. the local tax rate on newly
employed capital, G. the stock of local public goods, p
3 the
price of firm j's product on the world market which is pro-
duced using technology f (•).
3. Behaviour of governments
We view governments as suppliers of club goods. Two types
of club goods may be distinguished: Type A serves as an
input factor to private production activities, Type B is
consumed by immobile factors in the form of subsidies and
transfers. If entrepreneurs want to avail themselves of the
benefits from Type A club goods, they have to invest within
the jurisdiction of that particular government. Free-riding
therefore is - to a large extent - excluded. Examples of
Type A club goods are manifold: the maintenance of an econo-
mic order including e.g. the maintenance of a stable price
level, the guarantee to enforce private contracts, and the
provision of an open regime for international trade in goods
and capital including the maintenance of convertibility for
residents and non-residents. One may also include decisions
to organize the provision of important infrastructure goods
such as a telecommunications network and streets among Type
A club goods. Note that this does not imply that the govern-
Club goods are consumed non-rivalrously by a group of
beneficiaries from which non-payers can be excluded. A
typical example is the screening of a movie.- 9 -
ment itself produces these goods. In many cases the actual
provision of Type A club goods will be handled in a more
efficient manner by private enterprises, who have acquired
production licenses from the government. We assume that the
most efficient •. division of labour for the production of
local public goods - private or public enterprises - will"be
revealed by the trial-and-error process of competition for
capital. Governments that have organized this division in a
particular efficient manner may be imitated by less suc-
cessful ones.
Governments differ in their ability to organize the pro-
duction of local club goods. Some are more efficient than
others and therefore are more successful in attracting in-
ternationally mobile resources. These governments either
- produce - a given output of Type A club goods with a smaller
amount of tax receipts than other governments (attractive
membership fee) or
- supply Type A club goods that are more suited to the needs
of the owners of mobile resources (attractive club good).
Governments finance the provision of local club goods by
levying a tax on capital invested within their jurisdiction.
We assume that governments aim to maximize the amount of
transfers and subsidies (club good type B) by choosing the
rate of capital taxation and the provision of local club
goods. The rationale for this assumption on government beha-
viour is that governments expect the probability of reelect-
ion to increase with the amount of transfers and subsidies,
S.. From the budget constraint of the government it follows
1 1
that S. can be expressed as
si = VW V -
We assume a balanced budget of the government throughout
in the sense that the government does not run deficits
which are financed by the private sector.- 10 -
where K. is the total capital stock invested within country
i which we assume to be a negative function of the rate of
capital taxation and a positive function of the amount of
local public goods. s. are the unit costs of local public
goods which the government pays to their producer.
II.2. The competitive process
Given these assumptions, one can picture a competitive pro-
cess among the governments of different nations. Imagine a
group of countries where barriers to cross-border flows of
goods and financial capital are removed. Governments will
then have to decide on the economic policies they plan to
implement. In terms of our model, they have to set the rate
of capital taxation and they have to organize the amount and
quality of local club goods. We assume that in a first peri-
od after liberalization governments behave as if in monopo-
listic competition, i.e. they are as yet not aware of the
economic consequences of the new open economic regime. In
particular, they do not expect economic policies in other
countries to influence the inflow of internationally mobile
resources which they hope to attract. As a result, the ex-
pectations of some governments will be thwarted. In a second
period after liberalization governments will have learned to
live with the new system and will be aware of the repercus-
sions of their own and other governments' policies on capi-
tal formation within their jurisdiction.
Strictly speaking, in any one period it is only investment
that is responsive to changes in G. and t.. The capital
stock already in place is no longer mobile and cannot
escape higher levels of taxation or lower levels of go-
vernment output.- 11 -
As monopolists, governments set their policy parameters (t.
and G^) in period 1 by maximizing transfers S. (equation
(2)). The necessary conditions for a transfer maximum are







 = ° (4)
Equation (3) implies that a government will continue to
raise the rate of capital taxation as long as the increase
in government revenues from a marginal increase in the tax
rate exceeds the loss in investment brought about by that
marginal increase. Equation (4) implies that a government
will continue to expand the provision of local public goods
as long as the tax revenues generated by this expansion
exceed the costs. Equation (3) implicitly defines an optimal
rate of capital taxation, t., equation (4) does the same for
1 *
the optimal amount of local club goods, G..
Once the decisions of all governments are known, capitalists
compare marginal after-tax profits in all countries (includ-
ing their current country of residence) that allow foreign
i * capital to enter. The profit-maximizing investment k. and











The highest marginal profit that firm j can obtain in coun-
i * i * j *
try i, n. , may then be calculated by substituting k. , 1. ,- 12 -
-i *
Gr , t^ , p
J, w., and r into equation (1). Firm j will per-
form similar calculations for all countries. It will invest





Figure 1 depicts our analysis up to now. It illustrates the
situation of firms and governments at the end of period 1,
i.e. governments have not yet learned about the implications
of the newly liberalized regime. On the horizontal axis the
tax rate on investment ("t") is plotted, on the vertical
axis the supply of club goods type A ("G"). The dots la-
Figure 1 - Competition among governments for internationally
mobile resources- 13 -
belled C^ to C.Q denote the decisions of different coun-
tries': country Cg which has a very low tax rate on invest-
ment offers only a small supply of club goods. Country C. -.
finds itself at the other end of the spectrum with a high
tax rate and a large supply of club goods. Note that the
parameters t. and G. were set by each government according
to the decision calculus described in equations (3) and (4).
Firms' decisions are represented in figure 1 by iso-profit
curves. Curve n , e.g., represents the locus of all combina-
tions of t and G which lead to a marginal profit level of n_
for firm 1. Iso-profit curves are positively sloped. As the
tax rate increases, firms require an increasingly higher
supply of Type A club goods in order to achieve the same
level of marginal after-tax profits. Higher marginal profits
are located to the north-west; if for the same tax rate a
higher supply of firm-specific public goods is produced, the
marginal profits of firms rise. The curve labelled n.. is the
highest iso-profit curve of firm 1 that is tangent to any of
the offers of the different governments. In our hypothetical
example, firm 1 will therefore locate its marginal invest-
ment project in country Cg, firm 2 in country C. , and firm 3
in country C. 0. All other countries will receive no new
capital. The governments of countries C2 to C8 are expected
to redesign their policies after going through a period of
learning. A concrete example for such a change in policy
might be for country C, to lower its tax rate on investment
to t
1 while maintaining its supply of club goods (type A) at
the level of G
1. Such a policy combination would be pre-
2 2 ferred by firm 2 to its present location C. (n.. > n^) . It
would therefore invest in country C, in the next period. Of
course any other country could also supply the policy
package (G
1, t'). In general we expect governments to at-
tempt to become more successful in attracting international-
ly mobile resources and thus move towards the shaded area in
figure 1. The following trends may be expected to accompany- 14 -
this move towards more efficient government policies:
- unlike in the initial period of trial-and-error learning
every country will attract some investment;
- the countries that were most attractive for investment in
period 1 will receive a "smaller share of total investment,
both because other countries will catch up and because the
profitability of marginal investment within their borders
will decline; over time, the governments of those locat-
ions are expected to redesign their policies in order to
offer a better menu of policies for prospective investors;
- the amount of transfers and subsidies (Type B club goods)
will fall in all countries as governments devote a larger
share of their income from taxes to the provision of Type
A club goods.
Since each firm's profit depends in varying degrees on the
productivity of capital and the parameters set by govern-
ments, not all firms will locate in one country. One can
therefore imagine that this process may lead to a state
where each country caters to a clientele of firms. The
threat of not receiving new capital keeps governments effi-
cient. Moreover, the existence of a wide choice of different
government policies serves as a mechanism to discover parti-
cularly efficient government policies. Albert Hirschman has
drawn attention to the role of public goods in restraining
exit of citizens and capital. He comes rather close to our
2
present approach in his essay "Exit, Voice, and the State":
"It is possible to visualize a state system in which,
in spite of close contact and free movement of people
and capital, exit would never assume threatening pro-
portions because each country would supply its citizens
with a different assortment of public goods, with em-
phasis on one area (or cluster) as a special attraction
for its own citizens. Different countries would then
'specialize' in power, wealth, growth, equity, peace-
fulness, the observance of human rights, and so on."
This point is emphasized by Eucken (1960), p. 57 and
Vaubel (1985), p. 232.
2 Hirschmann (1981), p. 263-264.- 15 -
In many ways our approach also parallels Tiebout's analysis
of local public goods. Tiebout (1956) argued that the supply
of local public goods by communities (police protection,
leisure amenities, roads etc.) could match the preferences
for those goods because citizens would "vote with their
feet" by moving to that community which best suited their
preferences. In contrast to the standard theory of public
goods where free riding impedes the revelation of prefer-
ences, Tiebout maintained that there is a competitive mecha-
nism (migration to attractive communities and away from
unattractive communities) which would fashion the supply of
local public goods in accordance with citizens' preferences.
Our present approach takes the Tiebout paradigm to the na-
tional/international level: voting by one's feet is substi-
tuted by voting by one's capital , local communities are now
nation states and the services on offer are macro-economic
policies such as tax regimes, monetary policies, the supply
of infrastructure etc.
Parallels between the work sketched out here and research in
local public finance such as Tiebout's model are by no means
accidental. Increasing economic interdependence has the
2
tendency to render political borders obsolete. Because of
this tendency, the economic relations of nation states
(trade and factor movements) become increasingly similar to
those of federal states within a nation state. This implies
that national governments' ability to affect the course of
their economies will be increasingly limited. It seems in-
teresting to speculate on possible reactions of politicians
faced with this prospect.
Note, however, that voting by one's feet is at work even
on the national/international scale. The discussion on the
"brain drain" from developing countries to developed coun-
tries is a case in point.
2
Cf. Giersch (1989) for an elaboration of this point.- 16 -
II.3. International coordination of policies
.Competition for internationally mobile resources among poli-
cymakers will be reduced if national governments find it
worthwhile to coordinate their policies. The choice between
policy competition and policy collusion will be governed by
the net benefits that policy-makers can derive from each
activity. At this stage it is of importance to distinguish
between two models of politicians' behaviour. The Keynesian
policy-maker is usually assumed to act in the interest of
the citizens of his own country but not in the interest of
citizens of other countries. In other words, he will only
adopt those policies which he expects to benefit his own
citizens regardless of their effects on other countries.
Critics of the pro-coordination-view have argued (in line
with public choice theory) that politicians act neither in
the interest of citizens of their own country nor in the
interest of citizens of other country but are primarily
concerned with furthering their own goals. In the present
paper we explore the implications of both modes of behaviour
within the framework of competition for capital. We begin by
elaborating on the costs and benefits of coordinating poli-
cies for the politician assumed to pursue the good of his
own country's citizens.
In a Keynesian world where output is demand determined, the
benefits from coordinating policies for each individual
policy-maker essentially derive from the fact that demand
spillovers are traded. Each policy-maker knows that his own
measures will have some effect on demand and output in the
other country. By entering into cooperation with other poli-
cy-makers, he trades these spillover effects. Just like in
any other trade, both policy-makers (and their countries)
gain. Against this gain the costs of coordinating policies
and policing the agreement have to be set but they are
usually thought to be negligible.- 17 -
From the competition-for-capital-view presented here, there
are no spill-overs that can be traded. Each country captures
the benefits of its policies exclusively because enterprises
will have to move within its borders in order to benefit
from them. If there are no gains to be traded, a benevolent
policy-maker cannot expect to gain anything from policy
coordination. Any international policy agreement designed to
benefit other countries would invariably amount to an at-
tempt to render his or her own country less attractive to
internationally mobile resources. By definition a benevolent
policy-maker would never accept such an international agree-
ment .
How do these conclusions change if we assume the public
choice mode of behaviour for politicians? Leviathan-type
behaviour of politicians can be modelled along the lines of
section II.1., i.e. politicians are mainly interested in
maximizing the amount of transfers and subsidies S. that
they exchange for vote support in elections. From equation
(2) it is clear that S. increases only if politicians manage
to raise the price of their product (t.) or - with a given
price t. - produce a smaller amount of club goods Type A
without inducing a flight of mobile resources. As long as
governments have to compete for internationally mobile re-
sources, however, the exit-(and: non-entry-)option of owners
of mobile capital serves as a restraint on attempts to raise
S. beyond a "normal" level, i.e. as a restraint on Levia-
than-type behaviour. In this sense competition among govern-
ments can be considered as a substitute for more formal,
direct attempts to curb "the power to tax", such as con-
2 stitutional amendments. International coordination in the
field of macroeconomics, on the other hand, can be inter-
Cf. Dreze et al., p. 25: "[the supply side] by and large
does not require cooperation... Indeed, most of the sup-
" ply-side measures ... can be implemented at national le-
vels by individual countries acting on their own. Not only
•the measures, but also their effects, are of a primarily
domestic nature".
Cf. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Ch. 9.- 18 -
preted as an act of collusion among governments. By removing
international competition among policies, governments would
be able to raise the price of goods supplied by them, en-
large their own choice set but reduce the choice set of
citizens. Intergovernmental negotiations over macroeconomic
policies remove a constraint on the Leviathan tendencies of
governments. This idea can be demonstrated using our pre-
vious diagram. Suppose that the governments of countries C_
to C ("G 7")decide to coordinate their macroeconomic poli-
cies. Public choice analysis then predicts a concerted shift
to the east, possibly to the south-east of the diagram. This
represents the increase in the price of the goods supplied
by governments. In addition, it is expected that policies
will converge to the same philosophy (e.g. "removing imba-
Fig. 2 - From Competition to Collusion: How the Choice Set





Vaubel (1985), pp. 234-235.- 19 -
lances"). This convergence represents the shrinking of the
choice set of firms. Figure 2 also shows that the formation
of the policy cartel is endangered by outside competition.
Country C. ("Switzerland") is a case in point: by not join-
ing the coordination effort, its relative attractiveness is
2
even enhanced by the coordination exercise.
If politicians seek to further their own goals, possibly at
the expense of their constituency, international negotia-
tions thus open the possibility of escaping from restraints
on such tendencies. This might be one reason for the recent
upsurge in demands for international policy coordination.
Contrary to many statements in the press and in communiques
of summit meetings, increased interdependence per se does
not necessitate the increased coordination of policies. It
does, however, narrow the choice of what politicians can do.
For a politicion faced with this prospect, international
negotiations hold the promise of putting the control over
resource allocation at least partially back into his/her own
4
hands and away from the market for policies. The gains
from negotiating policies therefore increase for the indivi-
dual policy-maker as policy competition increases.
Cf. with Olson (1986), p. 123, who argues: "There is a
need for distinctive jurisdictions whenever people in
different communities demand greatly different public
goods and leaderships",
o
Assuming that "G7" does not evolve into a fortress by
curbing resource mobility to the rest of the world. Even
then C. would, however, gain from increased capital in-
flows originating in third countries.
A formal proof can be found in Martinez Oliva (1989).
A number of authors have focussed on the question when
such a linkage among two or more jurisdictions yields net
benefits to politicians. Cauley at al. (1986) show that
the fixed costs of establishing the linkage, the number of
participants and the conjectures of each participant con-
cerning the behaviour of the other participants are all
decisive factors. Related work can be found in Sandier et
al. (1983) and Olson (1986).- 20 -
II.4. A historical example: Money supply and inflation rates
after 1973
We illustrate the competitive process among governments by a
closer look at the evolution of real money stocks and infla-
tion rates in different countries after the break-down of
the Bretton Woods-System. The Bretton Woods-System of fixed
exchange rates can be seen as a cartel of producers of money
under the price leadership of the United States. Each member
of the cartel was allowed to supply a particular clientele
of customers, i.e. the population of the respective member
countries. Although one of the principal aims of the Bretton
Woods-System from the outset, non-resident convertibility
was only granted by very few member governments, West Germa-
ny being one of them. As a result, competition among the
different producers of money was effectively curtailed, the
system closely resembled a cartel of local monopolists.
It is well-known that the Bretton Woods-System owed its
demise mainly to the decision of the price-leader United
States to raise the price of holding money, i.e. the in-
flation rate, to a level that was no longer accepted by the
other members of the cartel. We argue here that the end of
the cartel marked the beginning of a competitive process
among the different producers of money, i.e. the different
central banks. Actual developments after 1973 are therefore
expected to resemble the theoretical events predicted for
"period 1" as set out in section II.2. In particular, we
expect an initial learning period where governments continue
to act as (local) monopolists, but are no longer constrained
by the control of the price leader. After the initial learn-
ing period is over and countries enter "period 2", those
governments that were not particularly successful in their
policies in the first period are expected to revise them,
moving - in terms of fig. 1 - in a north-westerly direction.
To close observers.of international monetary affairs during- 21 -
the last two decades it will not come as a surprise that
actual events conform rather closely to the theoretical
picture painted here.
Fig. 3 charts the inflation rate (defined as the annual rate
of change of the consumer price index) and the real money
stock (defined as Ml deflated by the consumer price index)
of*six major industrial countries after 1973. The initial
le'arning period ("period 1") was arbitrarily defined to
encompass the first eight years after the break-down
(1973-1980), "period 2" comprises the following seven years
(1981-1987). The average levels of the real money stock and
the inflation rate during the years before the end of the
Bretton Woods-System (1960-1972) serve as an index base for
each country. Thus in period 1 (1973-1980), the inflation
rate in West Germany ("BRD") was on average 5.02 p.c. This
Figure 3 - Real Money Stock and Inflation Rates after the
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constitutes an increase of 71 p.c. over the average in-
flation rate in the base period (1960-1972), 2.93 p.c. For
the real money stock, the increase in the level from the
base period (143 billion DM) to period 1 (220.2 billion DM)
is equivalent to an increase of 54 p.c. The coordinates of
the West German position in Fig. 3 are thus (171, 154) for
period 1 if the average levels of the inflation rate and the
real money stock from 1960 to 1972 are set at 100 each to
serve as the index base. The position of other countries and
for period 2 are similarly calculated.
The following observations emerge from Figure 3:
- The biggest increase in the real money stock compared to
the base period occurred immediately after the Bretton
Woods-System's breakdown and was most pronounced in Italy,
Japan, West Germany and France. The real money stock of
the cartel leader USA remained practically constant, while
that of the United Kingdom declined slightly in period 1.
- In period 2 only the central banks of West Germany, Japan
and the United Kingdom increased their real money stock by
a considerable amount. With the exception of the United
Kingdom, this increase was far less than that following
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods-System. Except for the
Bank of England in the first period, no central bank actu-
ally lowered its real money stock below the level of the
base period.
- All central banks raised the price of their product, i.e.
their inflation rates, in period 1. They did so in widely
varying degrees with West Germany and Japan at the lower
end of the spectrum and Italy and the United Kingdom at
the upper end.
- In period 2 all central banks engaged in price competi-
tion, i.e. they lowered their respective inflation rates.
Only West Germany and Japan, however, managed to offer
their money stock at a price (inflation rate) below the
level that prevailed during the Bretton Woods-System.- 23 -
- In period 2 inflation rates started to converge to an
average level of inflation similar to the one prevailing
under the Bretton Woods-System. Nevertheless, there is a
crucial difference: while low inflation rates under the
Bretton Woods-System were the result of hegemonic pressure
by the price leader of the cartel, they were now the re-
sult of a - possibly painful - trial-and-error learning
process. As such, however, low inflation rates are ex-
pected to be more firmly advocated and pursued by policy-
makers than before.
The behaviour of inflation rates and the real money stock in
six major industrialized countries thus converges to our
theoretical predictions rather well. The break-down of the
Bretton Woods-System constitutes the collapse of a cartel of
central banks and governments. Not unexpectedly, with the
dismantling of the cartel, it was the "minor" cartel members
who increased their supply of real balances the most while
the supply of the cartel's leader hardly changed. This seems
to indicate the presence of hegemonic pressure by the United
States on the smaller members of the Bretton Woods-System to
maintain a low supply of real balances as long as they had
been part of the cartel. After the cartel's collapse all
central banks misjudged the demand for real balances consi-
derably and as a consequence inflation rates increased along
with the stock of real balances in period 1. It was only
after this initial learning period was over that central
banks started to move - in terms of Figure 1 and 3 - in a
north-westerly direction towards more efficient policies.
-Central, banks predominantly engaged in price competition,
they did not raise their real money stocks in any consider-
able degree in the second period after fixed exchange rates
were abandoned.
We note the "special relationship" of the cartel leader
with the United Kingdom.- 24 -
III. A Closer Look at the Assumptions of the Alternative
View
In this section we examine some of our main assumptions in
order to indicate areas of" further research. We also point
to some related work of others.
III.l. Behaviour of entrepreneurs: How mobile is interna-
tional capital?
The key assumption of our approach is a high mobility of
capital. As long as capital mobility is low, local govern-
ments are protected from the competition of other govern-
ments and locations. Two effects of capital mobility on
competing governments are crucial for our approach:
- capital has to shy from locations where imprudent policies
are pursued, thereby signalling to the incumbent policy-
makers the need for a salutary change in policies, and
- governments that have adopted good policies must be "re-
warded" by inflows of capital from abroad.
The idea that capitalists avoid countries where the profi-
tability of their investment projects is reduced by govern-
ment policies is not new. Among the first to describe this
phenomenon was Adam Smith:
"The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the
world, and is not necessarily attached to any particu-
lar country. He would be apt to abandon the country in
which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in
order to be assessed to a burdensome tax, and would
remove his stock to some other country where he could,
either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more
at ease. By removing his stock, he would put an end to
all the industry which it had maintained in the country
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book V, Part II.f.6.-• 25 -
f which he left. Stock cultivates land, stock employs
labour. A tax which tended to drive away stock from any
particular country, would so far tend to dry up every
source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to the
society."
Whether the flight of capital initiates a change for the
better in the economic policies of the country is an open
question. The experience of France during the early eighties
and her subsequent turn to more supply-side policies seems
to be a case in point. The experience of a number of de-
veloping countries that underwent periods of substantial
capital flight raises doubts, however, since no clear re-
versal in their policies can be - as yet - discerned.
The importance of capital mobility for policy competition
goes beyond curbing harmful policies. It is also assumed to
be a way of finding the optimal tax rate and the optimal
•supply of public goods. For this to be true, it is not
enough that capital movements signal bad policies, they must
also "reward" good policies by increasing the capital stock
of a country. In other words, inward capital movements have
to occur in response to prudent policies and lead to addi-
tional investments in that country. This is not self-evident
as was clearly understood by Adam Smith: . .
"The capital, however, that is acquired to any country
by commerce and manufactures, is all a very precarious
and uncertain possession, till some part of it has been
secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement
of its lands... No part of it can be said to belong to
any particular country, till it has been spread, as it
were over the face of that country, either in build-
ings, or in the lasting improvements of land."
In other words, a flow of financial capital to another coun-
try is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an
increase in the real capital stock of the receiving country.
For a transfer of real capital from one country to another
to occur there must be a net transfer of financial capital
1 Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book III, Part IV.- 26 -
and that inflow must be used for "lasting improvements of
land" (as Adam Smith put it) or for investment in plant and
machinery (in a more modern language). Since capital bor-
rowed from abroad can be used either for investment or for
consumption, it is far from clear whether net financial
flows of capital lead to increases in the capital stock.
The fact that the high mobility of international financial
capital does not necessarily imply a high mobility of real
capital has been noted by a number of authors. Empirical
evidence seems to suggest that the mobility of real capital
is in fact rather low: following up a study of Feldstein and
Horioka (1980), Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987) find
that investment levels and saving levels as well as changes
in these levels are positively correlated in a large number
of countries over long periods of time. Why should such a
positive correlation be a sign of low capital mobility? The
reasoning is roughly as follows: with perfect capital mobi^-
lity, a marginal increase in domestic savings should be
allocated by the world capital market to various locations
in the world according to the relative elasticity of the
2 marginal productivity of capital in those locations. In
general this need not result in a corresponding increase of
domestic investment. Similarly, improved investment condi-
tions within a country need not imply an increase of dome-
stic savings. Instead, one would expect this country to
attract capital from abroad to match the additional invest-
ment opportunities. Several reasons have been given for the
apparent slowness of international real capital movements:
- it takes time to build up the real capital stock - fac-
tories and machines are not created instantaneously;
- within a foreign jurisdiction, the risk of expropriation
might prevent investment to take place.
Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987), p. 522 ff.; Niehans
(1984), pp. 120 ff.; 195 ff.
2
For a theoretical demonstration cf. Niehans (1984), pp.
111-112.- 27 -
Fundamentally, however, the issue remains unresolved: "We do
not know why the apparent isolation of national markets for
physical capital has persisted in the face of substantial
expansion of trade in goods and services and in financial
capital". We plan further research in this direction.
IIIJ'2. Does government activity matter?
We have assumed that government activities are a decisive
factor in explaining the locality of firms' investment and
therefore affect - for better or for worse - a particular
country's growth rate. This is by no means self-evident:
macroeconomic determinants of growth have only recently been
2 considered as explanatory variables for economic growth.
This growing emphasis on government activities as determi-
nants of growth reflects on the one hand the increased role
of the state in economic activity. It reflects on the other
hand the fact that the industrialized countries have seen
their traditional resource endowments (proximity to centers
of economic activity, natural resources) come under increas-
ing competition from developing countries as economic di-
stances shrank because of technological advances in trans-
portation and telecommunication. For industrialized coun-
tries, therefore, locational advantages increasingly come to
depend upon the ruling macroeconomic regime. In particular,
we expect differences in macroeconomic policies to be the
crucial determinant of relative growth performance in ad-
vanced industrialized countries, because they are roughly
similar as far as per capita capital endowments and natural
resource endowments are concerned. Between developed and
developing countries, traditional factors such as resource
endowments etc. may still have a major role to play. Compe-
.tition among policies is therefore expected to be especially
pronounced among the advanced industrialized countries.
1 Dooley et al. (1987), p. 528.
2
Cf. e.g. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Heitger (1986).- 28 -
ill. 3. Tax competition : •.,
While product competition essentially rests upon the ability
of governments' to match their supply of club goods to ,, the
needs of firms, price competition is not concerned with
product differentiation. Drawing a horizontal line through
any level of the club goods supply G in Figure 1, price
competition essentially forces governments to the western
most points on such horizontal lines. The term "tax competi-
tion" has been used for the adjustment of taxes in response
to pressures from outside the jurisdiction. In the litera-
ture, tax competition is most frequently treated in the area
of fiscal federalism. In particular, the question is, raised
whether the tax policies of federal states could lead to
inefficient results if they are not coordinated in one sense
or the other. Among the first authors who have answered this
question in the affirmative is Wallace Oates (1972, p. 143):
"The result of tax competition may well be a tendency
toward less than efficient levels of outputs of local
public services. In an attempt to keep tax rates low to
attract business investment, local officials may hold
spending below those levels for which marginal benefits
equal marginal costs."
Lately this question has sparked interest once again, in
particular because the Reagan tax reform of 1986 abolished
the deductability of state and local sales taxes from income
taxes, a measure that was interpreted as a move towards more
tax competition among U.S. federal states. The possibility
of international competition among tax regimes was noted by
the Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung (German Council of Economic Ad-
visers) in its 1985 annual report, in which it prophesized
2 that "Ein Wettbewerb der Steuersysteme zeichnet sich ab".
How would such competition work?
Cf. McLure (1986) and comments on his article by Break
(1986) and Wildasin (1986). There is also a sizable theo-
retical literature on tax competition. Cf. the references
in McLure (1986) and his critique of their conclusion that
tax competition is inefficient.
2
Sachverstandigenrat (1985), p. 138.- 29 -
A change in the tax regime of a country can only improve
that country's attractiveness for business if it manages to
improve investment conditions. The international repercus-
sions of such a policy can be sketched out in a rough way.
First of all, the tax reform should raise the marginal effi-
ciency of capital. This would tend to stimulate domestic
investment because additional investment projects become
profitable. The real rate of return and the real interest
rate rise. If nothing else happens and in particular, if tax
policies in other countries remain as they are, this move
would tend to increase the amount of goods used inside the
country. The trade balance becomes less positive or more
negative. The monetary side of the adjustment process tends
to produce similar results. As the real rate of return on
investment in the country adopting the tax reform rises, the
demand for financial assets from that country will tend to
rise, if the increase in the rate of return on real assets
feeds through to financial assets. This increased demand
will lead to an appreciation of the currency of the reform-
ing country, partially offsetting the initial incentive to
export capital there. The net result is expected to be a
less positive or more negative current account balance. This
implies a success: contrary to mercantilistic policies, a
policy of improving the attractiveness of a country as a
site for investment implies, c.p., a more negative or less
positive trade balance. This is simply because fewer goods
leave the country and/or more goods enter it. In this sense
a tax reduction can be a feasible and sensible policy for a
single country to pursue.
It is interesting to note that a reduction in the tax rate
on interest and profit income of the investor is not suffi-
cient to attract more capital from abroad. This is so for a
very simple reason: the interest income on domestic and
foreign assets is - at least among OECD countries - taxed
1 *
according to the residence principle. A (honest) German
~ For an elaboration of this point, cf. H.W. Sinn (1988!- 30 -
investor in American bonds is not induced to ,; hold more
American bonds if the tax on interest income in the U.S. is
lowered. He would still have to declare interest income, from
U.S. bonds in Germany and be taxed according to German
taxes. He cannot escape the German tax by placing his capi-
tal elsewhere as long as the residence principle operates
and as long as he reveals the interest received from foreign
bonds. He will actually have to take up residence in the low
tax country in order to profit from the lower tax. That type
of mobility, however, is low and it needs a strong incen-
tive, i.e. a high taxable income, to exit to Monaco. '.The
main instrument of the politician anxious to attract capital
from abroad therefore is the tax rate on corporate profits.
Its reduction will benefit international investors regard-
less of their own taxes on profit and interest income be-
cause it will tend to increase the interest and profit in-
come before it is subject to local taxes.
IV. Conclusions
The following conclusions emerge from this paper:
1. Unwittingly or not, politicians find themselves in compe-
tition for internationally mobile capital when formulat-
ing economic policies.
2. If policies are competitive, reduced investment and capi-
tal flight are expected to serve as corrective feedback
mechanisms for bad economic policies. Policies are thus
expected to converge towards a spectrum of viable
packages of economic policies. We illustrate this trial-
and-error process by evidence on inflation rates and
money stock trends in the post-Bretton-Woods-era.
3. While competition among politicians serves investors in
every country and will be pursued by benevolent policy-
makers, it reduces the choice set of Leviathan-type poli-- 31 -
ticians. They will try to mitigate the impact of exit
mechanisms by increasing the domain of national policies.
Since we consider the Leviathan-model a reasonably accu-
rate description of politicians' behaviour, we share
sceptical views arguing against increased international
policy coordination. The case for maintaining and fo-
stering competition among politicians is equivalent to
.the case for maintaining and fostering competition among
1 firms.- 32 -
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